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Morris-Garner v One Step: Limiting the Scope of Gain-Based 
Damages 
 
It is rare even for a Supreme Court case to provide a judgment as consequential as this one, finally 
bringing clarity to issues first raised by Wrotham Park in 1973,1 imposing much-needed structure on 
the nature and availability of negotiating damages for breach of contract, and confining Attorney 
General v Blake as a wholly distinct form of award.2 In a field of confused terminology, Lord Reed 
adopted the nomenclature “negotiating damages” for Wrotham Park damages.3 That term will be 
used hereafter. 
 
A. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The orthodox legal position on damages for breach of contract in Scots law is that they are a 
substitute for performance. Their purpose, where specific implement is not possible, is to put an 
aggrieved party in the position he or she would have been in had the contract not been broken. 
Damages therefore look to the pursuer’s loss not the defender’s gain, with the classic formulation of 
the measure of compensatory damages found in Robinson v Harman.4 Then in 1973 came the 
Wrotham Park decision. In this case, a developer had built on land in breach of a restrictive 
covenant. The court declined to issue an injunction requiring the demolition of the houses so, citing 
Lord Cairns’ Act (now section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981) and notwithstanding the absence 
of any material loss, Lord Brightman made an award of damages as a “just substitute” in lieu of an 
injunction, assessed on the basis of a hypothetical release fee amounting to 5% of the profits made 
by the developer, a sum the court reckoned the developer might reasonably have demanded to have 
the covenant relaxed.5 
A line of cases followed, all concerning either tortious interference with property rights or 
breach of restrictive covenants where no pecuniary loss occurred, in which damages were awarded 
in lieu of an injunction and assessed on the Wrotham Park basis.6 This line of cases, however, 
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revealed inconsistency in courts’ understanding of the character of such damages. Thus, in the Court 
of Appeal case of Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes, Steyn LJ stated that, in his view, 
Wrotham Park damages were restitutionary in nature,7 an analysis subsequently rejected by Sir 
Thomas Bingham MR who, in Jaggard v Sawyer, asserted that he could not construe the damages 
in Wrotham Park as based on anything other than compensatory principles.8 On 27 July 2000, the 
House of Lords delivered its judgment in Attorney General v Blake and, in the process, rehabilitated 
the idea that Wrotham Park could be relevant in a breach of contract case. The ruling in this highly 
unusual case – where an account of profits was awarded to the Crown for breach of contract by the 
notorious traitor George Blake despite the absence of any financial loss – was by any measure 
inconsistent with the orthodox legal understanding of damages for breach of contract as 
compensation for the claimant’s loss. In delivering the leading speech, Nicholls LJ stated that 
awards of this kind could be made in exceptional circumstances and where the plaintiff has a 
“legitimate interest” in depriving the defendant of his profit.  
It was in attempting to show that, in some circumstances, an account of profits was available 
for breach of contract that Lord Nicholls discussed the Wrotham Park line of cases as instances 
where the need for a compensatory measure of damages had been disregarded.9 He concluded that 
cases existed where the claimant’s interest in performance was not easily measurable in monetary 
terms. In these instances, damages measured by financial loss may be an inadequate remedy and so, 
in suitable cases, damages could instead be measured by the defendant’s gain rather than the 
claimant’s loss. The decision indicated that Wrotham Park damages, now conceptualised as gain-
based, would be available more widely than before based upon the new Blake principle and as an 
alternative to normal (compensatory) damages in breach of contract cases where ordinary damages 
might not be a sufficient remedy. However the attempt to draw a connecting line between Wrotham 
Park and an account of profits left many unanswered questions to be resolved by subsequent case 
law. 
Following Blake, the citation of Wrotham Park became more common in judgments and 
negotiating damages were treated as available at common law in cases of breach of contract.10 The 
single most important case in this new line was Experience Hendrix, in which Mance LJ described 
Blake as marking “a new start in this area of law.”11 The hypothetical release fee awarded in 
Wrotham Park and an account of profits of the sort awarded in Blake were treated as different points 
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along the same continuum, respectively a partial and total disgorgement of profits.12 In the same 
case, Peter Gibson LJ stated that gain-based damages for breach of contract were available because 
of three factors: the deliberate nature of the breach; the difficulty in establishing the loss arising 
from the breach; and the claimant’s legitimate interest in preventing the contract breaker from 
profiting.13 In Marathon Asset Management v Sneddon, Leggatt J articulated the new test for gain-
based damages as being whether they were “a just response” (reflecting Lord Nicholls’ approach in 
Blake) in situations where compensatory damages were inadequate redress for the wrong done.14 
One of the most significant ideas to emerge from the line of cases following Blake, and illustrated 
by the present case, was the belief that damages assessed on the basis of a hypothetical release fee 
were available at the election of the aggrieved party in situations where identifying or quantifying a 
loss would be difficult. 
On the basis of this line of cases, it seemed that there was emerging a new doctrine of gain-
based damages with a test of whether or not such an award constituted, in the judge’s mind, a “just 
response” to the wrong constituted by the breach. The tension between this approach and the 
orthodox understanding of damages for breach of contract as compensatory meant that it was only a 
matter of time before the Supreme Court was required to address the point. 
 
B. THE FACTS 
In 1999, the appellants, Morris-Garner, sold a business to the respondents, One Step Ltd, and 
entered into a three-year covenant not to compete with or solicit clients from them. In breach of this 
covenant, they subsequently established a new company in direct competition to the respondent 
who then brought proceedings.15 At first instance the appellants were found to have breached the 
non-compete and non-solicitation covenants and the claimants asserted that, in view of the difficulty 
of quantifying their loss, the usual remedy of compensatory damages would not do justice and that 
an account of profits was appropriate.16 This was rejected by the judge, Phillips J, who decided 
instead that, because of the difficulty One Step would have had in identifying their financial loss, 
this was “a prime example of a case in which Wrotham Park damages should be and are 
available.”17 The sum awarded was “the amount which might reasonably have been demanded...for 
releasing the defendants from their covenants.” Phillips J concluded his judgment with the 
observation that the claimants were entitled to elect between ordinary (compensatory) damages and 
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Wrotham Park damages.18 This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal, closely following the 
criteria set down in Experience Hendrix, on the basis that it was a “just response” available at the 
discretion of the judge.19 A further appeal on the question of damages was then made to the 
Supreme Court. 
 
C. THE DECISION 
Lord Reed (with whom Lady Hale and Lords Wilson and Carnwath agreed) gave the leading 
judgment, which stands out for its detailed analysis of the doctrines articulated in Wrotham Park 
and their subsequent application. Lord Sumption gave a separate judgment upholding the appeal for 
slightly different reasons while Lord Carnwath also gave a separate judgment articulating his 
preference for Lord Reed’s reasoning over that of Lord Sumption. Due to limitations of space, 
neither of these judgments can be discussed here. 
The key element of Lord Reed’s judgment is his discussion of the development and 
application of negotiating damages beginning with Wrotham Park itself. The Wrotham Park line of 
cases is split by Lord Reed into two discrete phases: during the initial phase, equitable damages 
were awarded in accordance with Lord Cairns’ Act based on a notional release fee in substitution 
for an injunction. Every reported case in this initial phase concerned tortious interference with 
property rights or the breach of a restrictive covenant over land with damages assessed at the 
amount the court reckoned might reasonably have been demanded for the voluntary relinquishment 
of the right which the court had declined to enforce.20 The second phase began with Blake and 
involved the award at common law of damages calculated in a similar way though “on a wider and 
less certain basis.” It was Blake “in which the wider availability of such awards was signalled, but 
the seeds of uncertainty were sown.”21 Yet, as Lord Reed highlighted, negotiating damages were 
never sought in Blake and therefore lie outside the scope of its reasoning.22 
Discussing the key case of Experience Hendrix, Lord Reed concluded that the decision 
reached in that case could be supported purely on an orthodox (compensatory) basis and 
accordingly the following parts of the court’s reasoning had to be rejected: that difficulty in 
quantifying loss makes it unnecessary to identify such loss; that it is relevant to an award of 
damages that the breach of contract was deliberate; that it is relevant to an award of damages that 
the claimant has a legitimate interest in preventing activity carried out in breach of contract; and 
that damages for breach of contract and an account of profit are “similar remedies at different points 
                                                 
18 Para 108. 
19 Morris-Garner v One Step [2016] EWCA Civ 180, para 121. 
20 Morris-Garner, para 61. 
21 Para 48. 
22 Para 82. 
along a continuum.”23 Lord Reed similarly rejected the contention of Lord Nicholls in Blake that 
user damages (that is, damages given for the unlawful use of another’s property) were not 
compensatory in nature.24 
The assessment of damages by reference to an imaginary negotiation is, in Lord Reed’s 
view, entirely consistent with the orthodox understanding of damages as compensatory.25 Since they 
are not gain-based, there existed no right on the part of claimants to elect this form of damages; nor 
were gain-based damages available at the judge’s discretion as a “just response” where loss was 
difficult to identify or quantify. In certain limited circumstances, the loss sustained by the pursuer is 
the economic value of a right that has been breached, as for example where the breach concerns a 
restrictive covenant over land, a confidentiality agreement or intellectual property. In such 
instances, “[t]he defendant has taken something for nothing, for which the claimant was entitled to 
require payment”; ergo the pursuer’s loss can be measured by determining the value of this right 
considered as an asset.26 This is true of only some contractual rights, particularly those governing 
the use of land, intellectual property or confidential information, but not all.27 From this line of 
reasoning, Lord Reed concludes that there are only four situations in which negotiating damages are 
available: damages assessed by the value of a use wrongfully made of property (“user damages”) 
are available at common law in a small number of established categories for invasion of rights to 
corporeal movable or immovable property by detinue, conversion or trespass;28 damages are 
available on a similar basis for breaches of intellectual property rights;29 damages can be given 
under Lord Cairns’ Act in substitution for an injunction based on the value of the right which the 
court has refused to enforce;30 and, in breach of contract cases, negotiating damages will be 
available only where the loss suffered is represented by the value of an asset of which the aggrieved 
party has been deprived, such as the right to control the use of land or intellectual property or a 
confidentiality agreement.31 
Applying these findings to the present case, the court found that the judge at first instance 
had erred in assuming that the claimant had a right to elect how its damages would be assessed 
purely because loss was difficult to prove. No such election can be made, because the normal 
compensatory rules of damages apply and loss must always be established in order for a claim to be 
available. The court had gone further awry in supposing that the difficulty of quantifying the 
                                                 
23 Para 90. 
24 Para 66. 
25 Para 91. 
26 Para 92. 
27 Para 93. 
28 Para 95(1). 
29 Para 95(2). 
30 Para 95(3). 
31 Para 95(10). 
financial loss justified the abandonment of any attempt to quantify it. The Court of Appeal had been 
mistaken in treating the egregiousness of the defendants’ breach as justification for a non-
compensatory award and, further, in contending that damages based on a notional release fee were 
available at the judge’s discretion as a just response.32 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
While this judgment does not overrule the Blake line of cases, the contexts in which negotiating 
damages may be awarded have been strictly limited and the door, for the time being, has been 
decisively closed on a gain-based approach.  
There have been those, both in academia and in practice, who welcomed the Blake 
judgment, seeing it as a step towards a new and useful doctrine in English law whereby damages 
could be measured by reference to the contract-breaker’s profits, something which would encourage 
adherence to agreements and offer enhanced protection where parties’ interest in performance was 
not purely economic. From Lord Reed’s analysis, we now have a clearly articulated legal 
foundation for the assertion that the Wrotham Park line of cases was always on all fours with the 
established principles of compensatory damages. Blake, meanwhile, is now seen to have been a case 
sui generis, something unique or very nearly so, and based on principles distinct from the general 
rules of damages.33 Provided with this opportunity to address the development of gain-based 
awards, the Supreme Court has opted for the more conservative approach reasserting the 
exclusively compensatory nature of damages for breach of contract and sharply circumscribing the 
situations in which negotiating damages may be awarded.  
 
Leslie Dodd, Edinburgh Napier University 
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